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Abstract

In attempting to explain the degree of cooperation in the

leader~

follower dyad, leadership style and situational outcome, in a mixedmotive game, were controlled.

1?0 business employees, both male and

female, were paired with a leader who was projected as a Prisoner's
Dilemma game expert.

The subject, with the help of the leader who

was either democratic or autocratic, then played a round of the game
against a confederate subject.
game was controlled.

The win/lose outcome of the first

The subject was then given the opportunity to

play a second game against the leader, and the number of competitive
choices made by the subject was recorded.

After the second game,

the subject completed an attribution questionnaire.

The results in-

dicated that neither leadership style nor first game outcome effected
the amount of cooperation in the second game, however, women were
significantly more cooperative than men.

Analysis of the attribu-

tion scale showed that women rated the leader as more pleasant than
did the men, and the experimental groups rated the leader as more
pleasant than did the control subjects.

The short interaction

utilized in this study was viewed as a major factor which may have
had a strong influence on the results.
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The Leader's Method and the Follower's Outcome:
Predictors of Future Interaction

Social psychologists have assumed the task of explaining the
initiation, development, and termination of social events as they
exist over a large range of personal interactions.

The dyadic

relationship comprises only one small facet of social research and
yet it is critical due to the foundation it provides for further
group .development.

1his research studied only one example of the

dyad, that of the leader-followe r relationship.

This specific

situation is of interest due to the leader's increasing difficulty
in meeting production requirements, maintaining product quality,
and building worker motivation.

This research was an attempt to

provide empirical support for utilizing a specific leadership
style and the importance of considering other related facets of
the follower's environment so that a more productive dyadic relationship may be developed.
In reviewing past research in the areas of leadership, power,
and authority, two prominent leadership styles, autocratic and
democratic, emerge as those most often studied.

Lewin, Lippitt,

and White (1939) nrovided valuable insight into several opposing
styles with their classic study of leadership and group life.
The experimenters in that research assigned various types of
leaders to several groups of boy's clubs.

The group which was

given an autocratic leader reported a very controlled atmosphere,
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discontent and irritability directed toward other group members
and the leader, a great deal of nonconstructive criticism from
the leader, and a lack of ability for the members to direct group
activities.

In the democratic leader's group, there was a relaxed

atmosphere, opportunity for self-direction and social interaction,
and an environment which allowed the leader to be viewed as a
partner who deserved the member's cooperation.
Other research has looked directly at the authority or power
relationship.

Adams and Romney (1959) proposed a functional analysis

of authority based on a Skinnerian, verbal behavior, reinforcement
paradigm.

They suggested that the authority relationship was asym-

metrical in that the authority's initial response specifies its own
reinforcement, whereas the follower's does not.

Their central idea

in authority relations was that of reciprocal control and reinforcement of two individuals.

Basically, their paradigm stated that when

a person performed a task directed by an authority, the authority
was reinforced by its completion and the follower was reinforced
by the authority's acknowledgement of his performance.

However,

should the follower not comply with the request, or the authority
not acknowledge its completion, there is a break in the authority
sequence and the authority loses power over the follower.

Harvey

and Smith (1977) wrote that power is never a one-way street,
"if the existence of a social relationship depends on all parties
believing they can receive outcomes better than they could get
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outside the relationship, then all are dependent on the relationship in at least some measure" (p. 306).
The area of cooperation and competition is another major
aspect of the leader-followe r relationship.

Kelly and Stahelski

(1970a) conducted research which helped to explain this portion
of the dyadic interaction.

Their subjects were made to choose a

cooperative or competitive strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma game.
·The subjects were then paired with persons of opposite goal choices.
During the game, they were interrupted to ask their judgements of
each other's goals.

The most common error in perception of goal,

consisted of a judgement by the competitive person that his cooperative partner was competitive.

This misjudgement was a result

of a behavioral shift in the cooperative-co mpetitive interaction,
as the cooperative subject tended to behave more like the competitive one.

This shift is seen as a temporary means of adapting

to a competitive adversary, and not a permanent change in the selected
goal.

Additionally, the cooperative individual, but not the com-

petitive one, is aware of the latter's dominant role in the relationship.
The purpose of this research was to study the leader's effect
on the follower.

While not as precise as the Adams and Romney

(1959) paradigm nor as subjective as the Lewin et al.

(1939) re-

search, this work was an attempt to test if cooperation, directed
toward the leader by the follower, was effected by the differences
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in autocratic and democratic leadership.

The research discuss-

ed made it logical to support an emergent hypothesis:

a follower

who has experienced democratic leadership, when placed in an equal
relationship with that leader, will react in a more cooperative
manner than a follower who experienced autocratic leadership.
Reciprocation, reinforcement, and equity have a direct influence on the reward structure in the leader-follower dyad.
Reciprocation centers on the benefits gained or lost by both
parties.

The Adams and Romney (1959) paradigm mentioned above

emphasized a reciprocal aspect involving the follower's completion
of a requested action and the authority's acknowledgement of the
same as being the key to a workable relationship.

Equity research

looks into the distribution of rewards and payoffs as a function
of previous distributions and future interactions.

Studies by

Leventhal, Weiss, and Long (1969), Garrett and Libby (1973), and
Shapiro (1975) showed that when a first payoff was divided, if one
member was over or under rewarded intentionally, that individual
would consider that outcome when he distributed a subsequent
payoff.

However, if the under or over reward was a result of

chance, it did not figure into the computation of future payoffs.
Reinforcement in the dyadic relationship is also of interest.
Davidson and Steiner (1971) provided research results indicating
that reinforcements are communicative acts that inform the recipient of the probable intentions, attitudes, and freedom of the
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agent who administers them.

Considering these factors in the

dyad, it seemed logical to hypothesize that if a follower failed
to achieve his desired goal as a result of the leader's direction,
he would respond less cooperatively to the leader than would a
follower who achieved his goal due to the leader's direction.
In support of the Lewin et al.

(1939) findings, and the

direction of reseach in the areas of reinforcement and equity,
this study manipulated both the leader's methods and the follower's
outcome.

It was hypothesized that the interaction of leadership

style and situation outcome variables would result in the greatest
follower competition against the leader in that situation where
the leader was autocratic and the follower failed to achieve his
goal due to the leader's direction.

And conversely, that the

least evidence of follower competition would exist in that situation which involved a democratic leader whose follower achieved
his goal due to the leader's direction.
The possibility of a sex difference, as a function of either
leadership style or situational outcome, deserved consideration
as a major factor.

There have been many sex difference studies,

but such research directly related to cooperation and competition
is scarce, conflicting, and controversial.

Pruitt (1967), utilizing

college students, found a game by sex interaction in his study of
Prisoner's Dilemma.

The results showed that women were more co-

operative than men in the first phases of several games.

In
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attempting to account for this outcome, the author suggested a
possible basis to be the degree of generosity available and that
women tended to be more generous.

A pilot study using college

students and conducted in preparation for this research (Nimmich,
1977), produced a significant post hoc sex difference due to greater
cooperation by the women.

Thus it would appear that the sex factor

should be controlled in all future research in this area and_it
was a major variable in this study.

It was hypothesized that

women would display greater cooperation than men but that this
factor would not be involved in any interactions.
An

tion.

experiment such as this must consider the domain of attribuMost activities which take place between the members of a

dyad, are related to personal motives which one member attributes
to the other.

The follower may attribute the leader's style to

his personality or to the work situation.

The direction the

attribution takes will effect the relationship as it develops
and changes.

Kelley and Stahelski (1970b), in their comparison

of cooperative and noncooperative college students, reported that
each player attributed the other's behavior to their own view of
these personality dimensions.

Harvey and Smith (1977) wrote

that an individual was more likely to attribute intent where it
was consistent than where it was inconsistent.

Previously,

numerous assumptions have been made about attributions of interpersonal influence without sufficient data.

To combat this
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problem and to provide possible explanation for the follower's
reaction to the leader, this study utilized an experimenterdeveloped attribution scale using a semantic differential format.
This questionnaire is described in the method section and provided
information concerning the subject's intentions and the intentions
he attributed to the leader and/or his opponents.

The analysis of

this scale provided a comparison of the experimental groups and
another method of verifying the manipulation of leadership style
and situational outcome.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 120 volunteer employees from banking, industry,
government, and department stores in the metropolitan area of Richmond, VA.

These employees covered a cross section of educational

background and level of employment.

Since a leader must work with

all types, this subject pool seemed a good representation of the

actual population of followers.
Apparatus
The experiment required a small room which contained a table
divided in half by a partition which was approximately two feet high.
At one end of the table were two chairs, at the other end one chair,
and in the middle, at the partition, one chair for the experimenter.
Two identical, plastic-protected sheets, each printed with five
matrices, and necessary tally sheets to record the points awarded,
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were required for the experiment.
The matrix used for this study (Figure 1) was a non-zero sum,
Prisoner's Dilermna game as developed and researched by Rapoport
and Chammah (1965).

A major concern was the response set used by

the leader during his game against the subject.

Oskamp (1971)

and Wrightsman and Brigham (1973) provided the pertinent research
by

reporti~g

that a matching or tit-for-tat response set induced

. the greatest percentage of cooperative responses.

Since the measure

used in this study's analysis was the number of competitive responses,
it statistically strengthened the results to use a cooperative inducing response set in order that the subject could logically
pursue a cooperative strategy.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The semantic differential format for the attribution scale,
given after completion of the second game, consisted of four questions:
1.

In the first game I felt that the leader was:
Restrictive
Undemanding
Authoritarian
Hindering

2.

.- -. -..- .. -. - ..- -.. -.. Open minded
.·-·--·---·----·--·-·--·
. . . . . . . Demanding
.-.-.-.-.-. . . Democratic
-.·-·--·-·--·-·-·-·
. . . . . . . Helpful

In the first game my choices were:
Cooperative :_: __ :_: ___ : __ : ___ :_: Uncooperative
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:
:
-: -: -: - :- :
:
:
-: -: -: - :- :
-:-:-:-:-:-:-:

Inefficient :
Unsure
Careful

3.

Confident
Careless

In the second game my choices were:
Cooperative
Inefficient
Unsure
Careful

h.

Efficient

. .-.-.-..-.-.- Uncooperative
-.-.-.-.-.-.- Efficient
-.-.-.-.-.-.-. Confident
:
:
-: -: -: - :- -

Careless

As a person I see the leader as:
Friendly
Bad
Tense

-.-.-.-.-.-.-. Unfriendly
. . . . . . .
---·---·----·--·----·---·----· Good
.. -. -.. -..-. Easygoing
. - .- -

In the control condition, the word "leader" in questions 1 and

h

was changed to "bystander" and '·'second opponent" respectively.
Two additional yes/no questions checked for the confounding influences of prior information and whether the subjects were able
to explain how the experiment operated.
Procedure
The subject arrived at the location for the experiment and
signed a consent form.

The leader (constant male confederate)

and the experimenter were already present.

As the subject signed

the form, another subject (female confederate) entered the room.
Next, a rigged card drawing took place which resulted in the
subject being teamed with the leader for the first game.
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At this time all participants were directed to their seats
and the experimenter explained to the subject that the leader was
well versed in the game procedure and would be quite helpful in
obtaining the goal of maximum possible points.

The game procedure

was then explained to all participants through the use of a sample
matrix.

Additionally, during this explanation phase, the confederate

subject asked two standard questions in order to increase her cred. ibility as a real subject.
The actions of the leader in the democratic role consisted of:
greeting the subject upon his arrival, offering to keep score, and
providing advice while allowing the subject freedom in his choices.
Conversely, the autocratic role consisted of:

a serious and un-

friendly demeanor, taking the tally sheet and thus not allowing
the subject to keep score, and directing the subject's choices
while not allowing any difference in opinion.
The first game consisted of working through the five matrices
three times.

The experimenter gave appropriate responses for the

confederate subject to insure that the win/lose condition was
established.

These contrived responses were standardized as much

as possible according to the subject's responses.

The subject's

responses were directed by the leader who followed a set, beginning with cooperation (first S) and then randomly alternating from
that point on.

Upon completion of that game, the scores were

tallied and a winner and loser announced.
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After this announcement, the subject was informed that he would
be given the opportunity to play the game on his own.

The confed-

erate subject was thanked for her participation and warned against
discussing the experiment; the leader moved to the other end of the
table and the second game began.
The second game utilized the same five matrices, three times,
with the subject required to make his own 2-choice decisions.
The response set given by the leader was cooperative on the first
choice and from then on the leader simply reflected the latest
response given by the subject - a tit-for-tat strategy.

During this

game, the number of competitive choices made by the subject was
recorded by the experimenter.
At the completion of the second game the outcome was announced
and the subject was asked to complete the attribution scale.

The

win/lose outcome of the second game was not controlled as it did not
effect the experimental manipulation.

The subject was then given a

short statement to read which explained exactly what took place in
the experiment.

Any questions were also answered.

The subject was

thanked for his participation, requested not to discuss the experiment, and excused.
In the control (no leader) condition, the leader and confederate subject arrived after the subject.

A similar rigged drawing

took place with the subject being selected to play two games:

first

against the confederate subject and then against the usual leader.
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During the game explanation, the leader looked on with the subject
and then left the room until the first game was concluded.

This

was done so the leader would simply appear as another subject who
had no special information about the game or idea of the strategy
the subject used in the first game.

The contrived responses for

the first game and the response sequence for the second game were
maintained.
The treatment condition for each subject was randomly assigned
prior to the beginning of the experiment.
Results
The structure for this experiment was a 3 X 2 X 2 design.

The

factors consisted of type of leader, first game outcome, and sex.
The unit of measure for data analysis was the total number of
competitive choices made by each subject during the second game.
All tests for significance were conducted at the p<.os level, and
test confirmed the homogeneity of the group variances.
the F
max
Table 1 is a summary of the analysis of variance. There were no
significant interactions and only one main variable was significant,
that of sex.

In figure 2 are the mean number of competitive re-

sponses selected by each sex.

Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here

The analysis of variance for the attribution scale was performed
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as a repeated measures design at the p<.05 level, and the Fmax
test verified the homogeneity of the variances.

The first

question (D1) was descriptive ly reduced to an autocratic (+1) democratic (+7) scale.

The cooperative - uncooperati ve choice of

questions two and three were separately scaled from +7 to +1 respectively (D2 and D4).

The remaining three choices from each of

questions two and three were reduced to a planned (+7) - unplanned
(+1) scale (D3 and D5).

And, the last question was converted to a

rating of the leader as pleasant (+7) - unpleasant (+1).

This

analysis resulted in significanc e for three, two factor interaction s.
Table 2 is a summary of the analysis of the attribution scale ratings.
The significant interaction s of Leadership Style X Question Rating,
Situational Outcome X Question Rating, and Sex X Question Rating required that the design be split to test for simple effects.

These

tests pointed to significant results which showed that a) the experimental groups rated the leader

a~

significant ly more pleasant than

did the control group, b) the win/lose effect of the first game was
directly attributed to planned or unplanned strategy respectivel y,
c) the women rated the leader as significant ly more pleasant than
did the men.

Figures 3,

4,

and

5 reflect

the mean attribution

ratings as a function of the questions.

Insert Figures 3,

4,

5, and Table 2 about here
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Since the first question of the attribution scale was decriptively reduced in the above analysis and because it contained
the critical aspect of the democratic - autocratic dimension, a
separate, post hoc analysis was performed on the four items in
that question.

This analysis of variance was conducted at the p<.05

level and the Fmax test verified the homogeneity of the variances.
This analysis (Table 3) resulted in two significant first-order
interaction s:

Leadership Style X Situational Outcome and Leadership

Style X Item Rating.

A simple effects analysis pointed to the facts

that: a) subjects who had an autocratic leader and lost the first
game, rated the leader significant ly lower, across all items, than
did the other experimenta l or control group, b) the group with the
autocratic leader rated the leader as less open minded than did
the other two groups, and c) the autocratic leader group rated the
leader as more demanding than did the other two groups.

Insert Figures 6 and 7, and Table 3 about here

Discussion

The autocratic leadership style and the inability to achieve
goals did not produce the significant ly higher competition as
predicted.

Additionall y, the analysis of the attribution scale did

not produce a significant ly different rating of the leader on

the
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autocra tic-dem ocratic dimensio n.

This suggests that a) the leader

did not establis h his role well enough, b) that the situatio n was
not long enough to develop the establis hment of the role, c) the
followe r was intimida ted by the leader and thus suppress ed his
competi tive desires , or d) the experim ental design simply did not
work as projecte d.

A strong trend on the attribut ion rating, to

rate the autocra tic and democra tic leader as such, did exist.

This

trend was further supporte d by a signific ant differen ce in attraction towards the leader by those who interact ed with him.

The ex-

perimen tal groups rated him as signific antly more pleasan t than did
the control s, and those who had a democra tic leader showed a strong,
though not signific ant, trend to rate him as more pleasan t than did
those who had the leader in the autocra tic role.

In addition , the

post hoc analysis reflecte d a signific antly lower rating of the autocratic leader; he was describe d as being less open minded and more
demanding, however, no signific ant differen ce was found on the autocratic-d emocra tic dimensio n.

These trends would tend to support

the first two explana tions above.

In such a short interac tion, the

leader may not have had the opportu nity to establis h a strong autocratic role, especia lly if the subject blindly followed the leader' s
advice due to uncerta inty, thereby never having to be directed or
ordered by the leader to perform a specific action.

Althoug h

Prisone r's Dilemma is an establis hed form of obtainin g competi tive
and coopera tive behavio r, this non-stu dent subject pool may not have
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been sufficientl y familar with its procedure to view it as such and
thus did not see the game as a route for competitive behavior against
an autocratic leader.

However, since it is a proven format, future

research should provide for a longer interaction between leader and
This increased length

follower as they play through the matrices.

may provide time for the role-releva nt expectancie s to be established .
The situational outcome did not effect competition in a significant manner.

The attribution ratings did reflect significanc e on

the aspect of strategy in the first game.

Those who lost that game

claimed they used poor or unplanned efforts whereas those who won
said they utilized a planned method of play.

Additionall y, the

post hoc analysis reflected a lower rating, across all four items
of question one, of the autocratic leader by those subjects who lost
the first game, however, this possible credit or blame was not strong
enough to influence the second game outcome.

It again appears that

length of the interaction may have been a determining factor.

With

a longer leader-follo wer relationshi p, more intent may have been
given to the leader which might have produced the hypothesize d
competition as a function of goal denial.

Since equity and re-

ciprocation s are functions of intention, it would appear that the
subjects saw their outcome as strictly chance rather than the inability of the leader.
The obtained significanc e of the sex factor adds to the ever
growing dimension of sex differences .

Women were not as competitive

Interac tion Predict ors

18

as the men.

Additio nally, the women rated the leader, irrespe ctive

of role, as signific antly more pleasan t than did the males.

This

reaction could be a function of the female being more accustomed to
an autocra tic male or boss, or due to the males' being affected ,
by several conflic ting factors , when having to rate another male

(the leader was always a male).

This dimensio n should be more

specific in future research to pinpoin t why this factor was significant .
The outcome of this study would suggest that leadersh ip style
and situatio nal outcome do not effect competi tion.

However, the

existenc e of certain signific ant factors and other strong trends
points to the possibl e inconclu siveness of this data.

A ten minute

interac tion was apparen tly insuffic ient to establis h the leader' s
role and this factor alone may provide strong influenc es in future
research that could produce an outcome more in line with those
hypothe sized.
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Table 1
Analysi s of Varianc e:
Competi tive Responses

Source

df

MS

F

Type Leader (A)

2

6.85

o·.46

Game Outcome (B)

1

20.84

1.41

Sex (C)

1

108. 31

7.32*

AX B

2

5.66

0.38

AX C

2

o.68

0.05

B XC

1

8.51

o.58

AX BX C

2

24.92

1.68

108

14. 79

Error

*E.<.05
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance:
Attribution Ratings

Source

df

MS

F

Between
Type Leader (A)

2

o.85

Game Outcome (B)

1

1.65

Sex (C)

1

9.50

AXB

2

13.94

2.79

AXC

2

o.52

0.10

BX C

1

0.22

0.04

AX BX C

2

8.19

1.64

108

5.oo

5

27 .61

AX D

10

5.11

2.35*

BX D

5

5.10

2.34*

C XD

5

6.25

2.87*

AX BX D

10

3.75

1. 72

BX C X D

5

2.26

1.04

AX C X D

10

3.34

1.53

AXBXCXD

10

1.22

o.56

540

2.18

Errorb
Within
Attribution Scale (D)

Errorw

*E.<.05
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance:
Question No. 1 Ratings

Source

df

MS

F

Between
Type Leader (A)

2

20.78

Game Outcome (B)

1

.5.oo

Sex (C)

1

8.80

1.4.5

AXB

2

23.28

3.84*

AX C

2

2.46

0.41

BXC

1

0.17

0.03

AXBXC

2

18.22

3.01

108

6.06

Question Rating (D)

3

7.41

AXD

6

6 •.57

3.13*

BX D

3

0.3.5

0.17

CXD

3

1.00

0.48

AXBXD

6

1.62

o. 77

BX C X D

3

0.24

0.11

AX C X D

6

0.10

0.33

AXBXCXD

6

2.3.5

1•12

Errorb
Within

Errorw

il£_<.0.5

324

2.096
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Figure Caption

Figure 1..

An example of the Prisoner 's Dilemma, non-zero

sum matrix used in this experimen t.
R

= Reward points

S<.P<R< T

S

= Sucker points

2R~

T

= Temptatio n points

S + T

P

= Punishment points

S + T

=0

(R)

,
,

(R)

(S)

2

,

-2

-1

(T)

,

(S)

(P)

1

1

-2

,
,

,
,

2

(T)

-1

(P)
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Figure Caption

Figure 2.

Mean number of competitive choices made by each

sex during second game.

(p<.05)
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Figure Caption

Figure 3.

Mean rating for each question as a function of

leadershi p style.

n6 was significa nt (p<.OS).

D:
1
D2 :

Leader was autocrati c (+1) - democrati c (+7)

n3:
n4:

First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)

First game was uncooper ative (+1) - cooperati ve (+7)

Second game was uncooper ative (+1) - cooperati ve (+7)

n : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
5
n6: Leader was unpleasan t (+1) - pleasant (+7)
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Figure Caption

Figure

4.

Mean rating for each question as a function of

winning or losing the first game.

n1 :

n was significa nt (p<.05).

3
Leader was autocrati c (+1) - democrati c (+7)

n2 : First game was uncooper ative (+1) - cooperati ve (+7)

n3 :

First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)

n : Second game was uncooper ative (+1) - cooperati ve (+7)

4

n : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
5

n6: Leader was unpleasan t (+1) - pleasant (+7)
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Figure Caption

Figure S.
sex.

n6
D1 :
D:
2
n :
3

Mean rating for each question as a function of

was significant (p<.oS).
Leader was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7)
First game was uncooperati ve (+1) - cooperative (+7)
First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)

n : Second game was uncooperati ve (+1) - cooperative (+7)

4
n : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
5
n6: Leader was unpleasant (+1) - pleasant (+7)
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Figure Caption

Figure 6.

Mean overall rating by the first game losers

as a function of leadership style. (Significant at p<.o5)
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Figure Caption

Figure 7.

Mean rating for each portion of question one as a

function of leadership style.

n1 and n2 were significant (p<.05).
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7-

6 -

5z

*0

0

H

*

E-t
ti)

IL!

§

*+

0

4-

0::

+

*0

0

+

&

+

d

z

H

E-t

C2
:;i

3-

IL!

:a:

o

2 -

= CONTROL .(NO LEADER)

* = DEMOCRATIC
+

1 -

QUESTION

LEADER

= AUTOCRATIC LEADER

Interaction Predictors
31

~~~A

The following consent statement was signed by each subject
prior to the beginning of the experiment:
My signature on this document testifies to the fact that I
am participating in this experiment by choice.

I understand that

no information as to my participation or performance will be released, that no physical or psychological damage will result due
to my participation, and that I may stop the experiment at any time
should I feel it necessary.

Interaction Predictors
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Appendix B
The following statement was given to each subject at the
conclusion of experiment:
This experiment was designed to see how you would react toward
the leader who was either democratic or autocratic when he assisted
you in the first game.
won or lost.

The first game was controlled so you either

We then allowed you to play a second game against the

leader to see if you would be cooperative or competitive based on
his leadership style and whether you won or lost the first game.
Those of you who had no leader (an individual to work with)
during the first game were the control group which is critical
for the experimental comparison.
Again, I would like to thank you for your participation and
for the great assistance you have given me.

VITA
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south, at the age of three, to the little town of Summerville, just
outside of Charleston, South Carolina, I claimed the south as my
home.

In 1970, I graduated with a B. A. in History from The Citadel;

as a Distinguished Military Graduate, I was immediately commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army and entered on active
duty.

As a Field Artillery Captain, I have served at Ft. Sill, OK,

Ft. Benning, GA, Ft. Bragg, NC, and in the Republic of Korea.

My

next assignment will be at Rutgers University as an assistant professor of military science.

My

wife is the former Linda J. Elliott

of Andrews, SC, and we have two daughters, Michele Anne and Lisa
Marie.

